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Abstract
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when children differ in their cost
of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to
a “bequests rule” specifying a transfer conditional on the level of informal care. Care
provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards in order to minimize the rent of
low-cost ones. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents’
and children’s utility. The optimal uniform public LTC provision strikes a balance
between insurance and children’s utility. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion less
than full insurance is provided to mitigate the distortion on informal care which reduces
children’s rents. A nonuniform policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides
full insurance even against the risk of having children with a high cost of providing
care. Quite surprisingly the level of informal care induced by the optimal (uniform or
nonuniform) policy always increases in the children’s’ welfare weight.
JEL classification: H2, H5, I13, J14.
Keywords: Long-term care, informal care, strategic bequests, asymmetric information.
1 Introduction
Old age dependence and the need for long-term care (LTC) it brings about represents
a major societal challenge in most developed countries. Due to population ageing the
number of dependent elderly with cognitive and physical impairments will increase dra-
matically during the decades to come (Cremer et al., 2012). Dependence represents a
significant financial risk of which only a small part is typically covered by social in-
surance. Private insurance markets are also thin. Instead, individuals rely on their
savings or on informal care provided by family members. Currently the family is the
main provider and informal care represents roughly 2/3 of total care (Norton, 2000).
Informal provision has no direct bearing on public finances, but it is not available to
everyone. Whether this solidarity is sustainable at its current level is an important
question. Sources of concerns are numerous. The drastic change in family values, the
increasing number of childless households, the mobility of children, the increasing labor
participation of women are as many factors explaining why the number of dependent
elderly who cannot count on family solidarity, at least not for the full amount of care
they need, is increasing. Furthermore, it is not clear if the important role played by
informal care is desirable. Its real costs are often “hidden”. In particular, it may indeed
impose a significant burden on the caregivers which is both financial and psychological.1
In a nutshell, the current situation is inefficient as it leaves some elderly without
proper care and often imposes a considerable burden on caregivers. This market failure
creates a potential role of public intervention through social LTC provision or insurance.
However, the public LTC policy will interact with informal care, and more generally
with the exchanges within the family; consequently, policy design has to account for the
induced changes in transfers within the family.
Informal care can be motivated by some form of altruism, result from implicit ex-
changes or be “imposed” by social norms. Knowing the foundation of informal care is
1On the costs borne by caregivers, see Colombo et al. (2011) or Coe and Van Houtven (2009).
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very important in order to predict how family assistance will react to the emergence of
private or public schemes of LTC insurance.
In this paper we consider a setting where children can provide informal care to
dependent parents, and intergenerational exchanges are based on a care vs. bequest
(or gift) exchange. Children differ in their preferences, which determine their cost
(disutility) of providing informal care. This heterogeneity reflects the fact that the level
of informal care that can be obtained from the family in case of dependence depends on
a number of factors such as the presence of children, their proximity, working situations,
marital status, and the strength of family bonds.
Our framework is inspired by the strategic bequest approach,2 but it differs from the
conventional model in a crucial way in that parents do not perfectly know their children’s
preferences and their cost of providing informal care. Like in the conventional model we
assume that parents can commit to a bequest rule specifying a transfer, gift or bequests,
conditional on the level of informal care provided. However, because of the asymmetry
of information, this does no longer allow them to extract the full surplus generated by
the exchange from their children. Even though parents can use nonlinear rules to screen
for the children’s cost parameter, they will have to leave a positive rent to some of the
children.
In the laissez-faire, the help provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards
in order to mitigate the rent enjoyed by the low-cost ones. Parents are not insured
against the risk of dependence, nor against the risk that their children have a high cost
of providing care.
We then introduce social LTC in this setting. It is designed to maximize a weighted
sum of parent’s and children’s utilities. In other words we explicitly account for the
wellbeing of caregivers. This further differentiates our paper from most of the literature,
which has to a large extent concentrated on parents’ welfare.3 To concentrate on LTC
2See for instance Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Bernheim et al. (1985).
3Barigozzi et al. (2017) also account for the welfare of caregivers, but consider a different type of
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policies we assume throughout the paper that the government cannot make any direct
transfers to the children.
In the first part of the paper we consider a uniform social LTC policy. It provides to
all dependent individuals a given LTC transfer, which is financed by a uniform lump-
sum tax. We show that this policy affects distortions of informal care and thus the
distribution of rents between parents and children. The optimal policy then involves a
tradeoff between providing insurance to parents and enhancing the utility of the care-
givers. In the absence of informal care, social LTC insurance should fully insure the risk
of dependence. With informal care and strategic bequests, the optimal public LTC pol-
icy depends on the attitude towards risk of parents. Under DARA (decreasing absolute
risk aversion) preferences, public LTC insurance exacerbates the distortion of informal
care. Better insurance coverage makes dependent parents less reliant on informal care,
so that distorting down informal care is not too costly for them. Consequently, under
DARA, the optimal public LTC policy provides less than full insurance in order to mit-
igate the distortion of informal care and the reduction in (low-cost) children’s utility it
brings about. The opposite is true under IARA (increasing absolute risk aversion) pref-
erences, in which case the government should provide more than full insurance against
the risk of dependence in order to minimize distortions.
In the second part of the paper we consider nonlinear policies, where transfers form
parents to children are publicly observable and LTC benefits can be conditioned on
bequests (or gifts). The LTC policy can then screen for the children’s cost parameter,
even when the level of informal care is observable only to parents. The underlying
problem presents methodological challenges because we have to deal with a “nested”
principal-agent problem. While the policy can screen for the children’s cost of providing
care, this is done only indirectly via the parents. The latter do not observe their child’s
cost of providing care either but since they observe informal care, they have superior
family exchanges based on cooperative bargaining.
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information.
We show that, while with a uniform policy the results crucially depend on parents’
risk aversion, this is no longer true when the policy is restricted by informational con-
siderations only and can be nonuniform. In that case the available policy instruments
are sufficiently powerful to ensure that parents are always fully insured, even against
the risk of having high-cost children. And since they are fully insured, risk aversion no
longer matters. Even more strikingly, the tradeoff between the provision of insurance
to parents and the concern for the welfare of the caregivers which drives the results for
a uniform policy is not longer relevant when nonuniform policies are considered.
One surprising result regarding the impact of social LTC insurance on informal care
emerges in both cases. In most of the literature on LTC, crowding out of informal care
by public care is considered a serious problem. It makes the provision of social LTC
insurance more expensive and possibly even ineffective, when there is full crowding
out. If one accounts for the wellbeing of caregivers the impact of crowding out is more
complex. One might conjecture that is “bad” for parents, but “good” for children, since
it reduces the cost implied by care provision. However, this conjecture does not stand
under closer scrutiny, and is proven wrong or misleading by our results. This is because
in our setting children are paid for their care through gifts or bequests. Under full
information, when care decreases, their compensation is reduced to keep their utility
constant. Crowding out is then irrelevant. Under asymmetric information, on the other
hand, crowding out will reduce the rents of some of the children and thus effectively
decrease their utility, while it increases parents’ welfare. Consequently, the concern
for the wellbeing of caregivers does not imply that LTC policy should aim at reducing
informal care.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. We study the
uniform and the nonlinear LTC policies, in Section 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5
we provide some concluding remarks.
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2 Model
Consider a generation of identical parents. When old they face the risk of being de-
pendent with probability pi, while they are independent and healthy with probability
(1−pi). When young they each have one child, they earn an exogenous labor income of
wT of which they save s. They have preferences over consumption when young, c ≥ 0,
consumption when old and healthy, d ≥ 0, and consumption, including LTC services,
when old and dependent, m ≥ 0. Their preferences are quasilinear in consumption
when young. Risk aversion is introduced through the concavity of second period state
dependent utilities. The parents’ expected utility is given by
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piE [H (m)] ,
with m = s + a − τ(a), where a ≥ 0 is informal care provided by children, while τ(a)
is a transfer (bequest or gift) from parents to children. One can think of m as total
care, that is informal care a plus formal care s− τ(a), the price of which is normalized
to one. We assume that the transfer can be conditioned on informal care and assume
that parents can commit to this bequest rule. This is in line with the strategic bequest
literature. However, our model differs from the traditional literature on exchange based
intergenerational transfers in that we assume that parents may not perfectly observe
their child’s preferences and in particular their cost of providing care. The children’s
heterogeneity in cost is represented by a parameter β which is not publicly observable,
including to parents. Assume that β is distributed over
{
β, β
}
. In other words, β can
only take two values. The low one β occurs with probability λ ∈]0, 1[, while the high
level β occurs with probability (1− λ).
Children’s cost of providing care a to their parents is given by v(a, β), where 0 ≤
a ≤ amax, with va > 0, vβ < 0, vaa > 0, vaβ < 0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives.4 The cost is increasing and convex in the level of informal care. It decreases
4The assumption that there is an upper bound on informal care is quite natural. Furthermore it is
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in β, which amounts to saying that β is the “good type” for whom providing care is
less costly. Furthermore vaβ < 0 implies that the marginal cost of informal care also
decreases with β.
The children’s utility from helping their parents in case of dependence is
Uk = ck − v(a, β) ≥ 0
where children’s consumption ck = τ(a), that is the transfer from their parents.
Children choose a to maximize Uk
τ ′(a) = va(a, β), (1)
and the solution to this problem is denoted a(β). Observe that a also depends on
τ(·), exactly as labor supply depends on the tax function in a Mirrleesian-type optimal
income tax problem.
Anticipating their children’s behavior but not observing β, parents choose s and
τ(a) to maximize their expected utility given by
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(a(β))] .
To solve this problem we consider the equivalent mechanism design problem where
parents parents choose a(β) and τ(β) to maximize
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(β)]
subject to the relevant participation constraints, as well as the incentive constraints.
These constraints which come about when the parents do not observe β will be stated
and explained below.
Within this framework, we study the public provision of LTC benefits financed by
a lump-sum tax on parents’ first-period consumption. In addition, intergenerational
convenient for technical reasons.
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transfers τ may be taxed or subsidized. The policy is determined to maximize social
welfare which is given by a weighted sum of parents’ and children’s expected utilities.
Parents’ weight is α ∈ (0, 1), while children’s utility is weighted by 1− α.
The timing is as follows. The LTC policy is decided upon in stage 1, before parents
and children make their decisions. In stage 2, parents choose their level of savings s
and commit to the bequest rule τ(a). In stage 3, the dependence status of the parents
is realized and children choose a according to (1).
While we concentrate on the asymmetric information case, we start by considering
the full information benchmark, that is the solution parents can achieve when they
observe their children’s cost of providing care. We also characterize the optimal LTC
policy for this benchmark.
3 Uniform LTC benefit
In this section, we restrict the policy to a uniform transfer g financed by a lump-sum tax.
In other words, we consider universal public provision (or subsidization) of LTC. Such
a policy is clearly suboptimal if the government can condition transfers on bequests.5
However, it is relevant in practice, since the government may not be able to observe
bequests. Furthermore, even if the government was able to observe bequests, it may
be politically infeasible to condition g on τ . In this section, we first characterize the
optimal policy when parents can observe their children’s type. We then turn to the
asymmetric information case.
3.1 Full information benchmark
Parent’s choose s and commit to a bequest rule ex ante, that is before the state of
health and β are realized and observed. Since β takes only two values, it is convenient
5In Section 4 we will consider the case where g can be conditioned on bequests, so that the government
can screen for different levels of β.
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to introduce the following notation
τ(β) = τ ; τ(β) = τ ,
a(β) = a ; a(β) = a,
m(β) = m ; τ(β) = m.
Using this notation the parent’s problem can be written as
max
a,a,τ ,τ ,s
wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ a− τ + g)]
s.t. τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0, (2)
τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0. (3)
where pig is the lump-sum tax levied to finance the expected cost of social LTC transfers.
Conditions (2) and (3) represent the children’s participation constraint. While children
take the bequest rule τ(a) as given, they have the option not to exchange with their
parents: in this case there will be no care and no transfer and chilrden’s utility is an
exogenously given constant which without loss of generality is normalized to zero.
Under full information, the parent can extract all the surplus, and both participation
constraints are binding.6 Then, substituting for τ and τ from (2) and (3) the parent’s
problem can be rewritten as
max
a,a,s
P f =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)] .
The first-order conditions (FOC) with respect to the remaining choice variables are
6When a participation constraint is not binding parents can increase the corresponding a and/or
decrease τ , thereby increasing their expected utility.
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given by
∂P f
∂a
= (1− λ)H ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0,
∂P f
∂a
= λH ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0,
∂P f
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (4)
The first two conditions imply
1 = va(a, β) = va(a, β), (5)
which is quite intuitive. Under full information parents have to compensate children
exactly for their utility cost of informal care. Consequently, they equalize marginal costs
to marginal benefits, which are equal to one. Not surprisingly, this implies a > a and
m > m: low-cost children provide more informal care and their parents enjoy a larger
amount of total care, m, in case of dependence. To decentralize this solution parents
must then choose τ so that τ ′(a) = τ ′(a) = 1. Observe that neither a nor a depend on
g. Consequently, a uniform g can never achieve full insurance for the risk associated
with the uncertainty of β; parents with low-cost children are always better off.
We now turn to the government’s problem, which is given by
max
g
Gf =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)] , (6)
where s, a and a are the solutions to the parents’ problem for any given g. Since
the parents have full information, the children’s utility will be zero no matter what.
Consequently, the relative weight of children in social welfare is of no relevance and we
can just as well neglect this term in the welfare function.
Using the envelope theorem (for the induced effect on s) and recalling that the levels
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of a do not depend on g we have7
∂Gf
∂g
= −pi + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0.
Not surprisingly, this condition equalizes marginal costs and benefits of g. Combining
this condition with the parent’s FOC with respect to s in (4) yields
U ′(s) = [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = Eβ[H ′(m)] = 1. (7)
This condition states that the three possible uses of (first-period) income, direct con-
sumption c, deferred consumption s, and LTC insurance, g must have the same marginal
expected utility.
3.2 Asymmetric information
Except for the policy design, the previous section has presented a rather standard strate-
gic bequest model. Parents have all the bargaining power and have full information
about their children’s cost of providing care. We now turn to the more interesting case
where parents do not know their children’s type. We then have to add two incentive
constraints to the parents’ problem. The objective function does not change and the
participation constraints continue of course to apply. The parents’ problem can then be
stated as follows
max
a,a,τ ,τ ,s
P as =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi[λH(s+ a− τ + g)
+ (1− λ)H(s+ a− τ + g)]
s.t. τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0,
τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0,
τ − v(a, β) ≥ τ − v(a, β), (8)
τ − v(a, β) ≥ τ − v(a, β).
7We assume that the second order condition holds.
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This is a rather standard mechanism design problem and one can easily show that we
obtain the “usual” pattern of binding incentive and participation constraints. To be
precise, the participation constraint of high-cost children is binding so that
τ = v(a, β). (9)
Furthermore, the incentive constraint of β, the low-cost type, is binding. Using (9) this
condition can be written as
τ = v(a, β) + [v(a, β)− v(a, β)], (10)
where the term in brackets on the RHS represents the rent of type β. In words, because
low-cost children can mimic high-cost ones and provide a at a lower cost, they have
to receive a transfer exceeding the cost of the care they provide. This is particularly
interesting from our perspective because it implies that the utility of the caregivers is
no longer exogenously given. Some of them now receive a transfers which puts them
above their reservation utility level and this transfer may depend on the LTC policy.
Substituting for the transfers from (9) and (10) into the objective function, the
parents’ problem can then be rewritten as
max
a,a,s
P as =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β)− v(a, β) + v(a, β) + g)] . (11)
The first-order conditions are given by
∂P as
∂a
= (1− λ)H ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0, (12)
∂P as
∂a
= pi
{
λH ′(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]
}
= 0, (13)
∂P as
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (14)
From equation (12) we obtain 1 = va(a, β), which is the full information condition for
β, the low-cost type; see equation (5). This is the traditional no distortion at the top
11
result that, given the quasi-linearity of the utility function, does not only apply to the
rule, but also to the actual level of care a which is the same as in the full information
solution, and continues to be independent of g.
Turning to a, rearranging (13) yields
[1− va(a, β)] = (1− λ)H
′(m)
λH ′(m)
[va(a, β)− va(a, β)] > 0, (15)
where we have used vaβ < 0, which implies ∆va = va(a, β)−va(a, β) > 0. Consequently
we have va(a, β) < 1 implying a downward distortion for a. Intuitively, ∆va > 0
accounts for the fact that the rent of the low-cost type increases with a. The downward
distortion allows parents to mitigate this rent. Equation (15) also implies that a depends
on g, as well as the bequests left to both types, according to (9) and (10). For g = 0,
the solution to the parents’ problem yields the laissez-faire allocation.
We now turn to the government’s problem. Since the parents no longer have full
information, the low-cost children now have a positive utility level. Moreover, their
utility is affected by the LTC policy via its impact on the parents’ optimization problem.
Consequently, the relative weight of children in social welfare is now relevant. When this
weight is strictly positive, the LTC policy strikes a balance between providing insurance
coverage to parents and the concern for the wellbeing of the caregivers.
The government’s problem is given by
max
g
Gas =α{wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β)− [v(a, β)− v(a, β)] + g)]}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)], (16)
where a, a and s are determined by the solution to the parents’ problem. Observe that
parents’ utility is expressed as the solution to the reformulated problem (11) which is
an unconstrained optimization where the relevant IC and participation constraints have
been substituted into the objective function.
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Using the envelope theorem according to which we can neglect the derivatives of
parents’ utility with respect to a, a, and s, the FOC is given by8
∂Gas
∂g
=α{−pi + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)]}
+ pi(1− λ)(1− α)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]∂a,
∂g
= 0. (17)
Recall that the term ∆va = va(a, β) − va(a, β) is positive. Observe that the children’s
utility does not directly depend on s and that a does not depend on g, nor does the
high-costs children’s utility, which is always equal to zero, the exogenous reservation
utility. Consequently, the only behavioral response to the LTC policy that is relevant in
(17) is ∂a, /∂g which measures how g affects the level of care provided by the high-cost
children. The sign of this expression will in turn determine how the level of care affects
the caregivers’ utility.
Consider first the case where the caregivers’ utility is not included in social welfare,
that is α = 1. Using the parent’s FOC, expression (17) can be written as
U ′(s) = [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 1.
This is the same rule as the one under full information that was given by (7). In both
cases we have U ′(s) = 1 so that the level of s is also the same. However, the levels of
m will differ from the full information solution, which in turn implies that the level of
g will also in general be different, even though the rule is the same.
We use superscripts f and as to refer to the solutions to the full information and
asymmetric information problems, specified by (6) and (16) respectively. Suppose that
gas = gf . Then, λH ′(mas) + (1− λ)H ′(mas) > 1 , because mas < mf (as a is distorted
downward) and mas < mf (as low-cost children receive a positive rent); consequently
we must have gas > gf : the optimal level of LTC benefits is larger under asymmetric
information than under full information. Intuitively, g is higher to compensate in part
for the downward distortion in a that parents create to mitigate children’s rents.
8We assume that the second order condition holds.
13
Let us now turn to the case where α < 1, which includes the utilitarian case where
α = 1/2. In this case g is no longer solely determined to provide insurance to parents.
The optimal LTC policy also accounts for the impact of g on informal care and thus on
children’s utility (rents). Roughly speaking, when ∂a/∂g > 0 one can expect that the
effect described for α = 1 is reinforced by the effect of g on children’s rents. Since rents
increase in a, increasing g increases rents. In this case we have gas > gf . Conversely,
when ∂a/∂g < 0, the two effects go in opposite directions. Either way this discussion
shows that as soon as α < 1 the results will crucially depend on the sign of ∂a/∂g. The
study of this sign requires a closer look at the comparative statics of the parents’ problem
under asymmetric information. The following lemma is established in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 When the parents’ utility in case of dependence H(m) exhibits DARA we
have ∂a/∂g < 0; when H(m) exhibits IARA we have ∂a/∂g > 0.
This lemma shows that the effect of g (via the parents’ problem) on the level of
care provided by the high-cost children depends on the parents’ attitude towards risk.
Intuitively our results can be understood as follows. With DARA, as g increases, parents
become less risk averse. Then, reducing m in the bad state of nature becomes less costly
for them, and distorting a downwards becomes more attractive. The case with IARA
is exactly symmetrical. Note that empirically DARA appears to receive more support
(Friend and Blume, 1975).
Using equation (17) and Lemma 1 we can study the effect of α on gas(α). For
instance, we can compare the utilitarian level gas(1/2) with gas(1), the level achieved
when children are not accounted for in the social welfare function. With DARA we know
from Lemma 1 that a decreases as g increases, which in turn implies that the utility of
the low-cost child decreases; recall that ∆va > 0. Consequently equation (17) evaluated
at gas(1) is negative so that gas(1/2) < gas(1). Under IARA these effects are reversed
and we obtain gas(1/2) > gas(1). This result also goes through for intermediate levels
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of α. Totally differentiating (17) and rearranging yields
∂g
∂α
=
(1−λ)
α [va(a, β)− va(a, β)]∂a∂g
SOC
,
which has the opposite sign of ∂a/∂g. Accordingly, under DARA g increases in α, while
it decreases as α increases under IARA.
Using the FOC of the parents with respect to s, (14), equation (17) implies that,
whenever α < 1
U ′(s) < 1 < Eβ(H ′(m)) if ∂a/∂g < 0,
and
U ′(s) > 1 > Eβ(H ′(m)) if ∂a/∂g > 0.
Intuitively, the utility of dependent parents is distorted down with respect to the full
information case under DARA. In this case, providing full insurance against the risk
of dependence would push parents to cut the utility of low-cost children (by distorting
down a). From the perspective of social welfare, there is a then a tradeoff between
insurance and children’s utility, leading to less than full insurance. Accordingly, parents
have an incentive to save more and this increases their consumption if healthy. Under
IARA these effects are reversed.
The results obtained in this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the case where the children’s cost of providing care is not
observable and where public policy is restricted to a uniform LTC benefit g financed by
a lump-sum tax. Informal care is observable only by parents. The optimal LTC policy
is such that:
(i) The risk of having children with a high cost of providing care is not fully insured;
(ii) If children’s utility has no weight in social welfare, parents are fully insured
against dependence. This is achieved through a uniform benefit that is larger than in
the full information case.
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(iii) If the weight of children in social welfare is strictly positive, and the parent’s
utility in case of dependence H(m) exhibits DARA, parents are less than fully insured
against dependence. The uniform benefit decreases with the weight of children in social
welfare.
(iv) If the weight of children in social welfare is strictly positive, and H(m) exhibits
IARA, parents are more than fully insured against dependence. The uniform benefit is
higher than under full information and it increases with the weight of children in social
welfare.
4 Nonlinear policies
We now consider nonlinear policies under which the level of LTC transfers g can be
conditioned on τ , which is publicly observable. The LTC policy can then screen for
the children’s cost parameter β. We continue to assume that a is observable only to
parents. The underlying problem presents methodological challenges because we have
to deal with a “nested” principal-agent problem.9 While the policy can screen for β,
this is done only indirectly via the parents. The latter do not observe their child’s β
either but since they observe informal care, they have superior information.
We proceed exactly like in the previous section. We start with the full information
solution and then concentrate on the case where neither the parents nor the government
can observe the children’s type β.10 Parents observe a but the government does not.
The policy we study consists of a menu of LTC benefits and bequests pairs. Under
asymmetric information parents self-select into a benefit-bequest pair. We will also
continue to assume that the government cannot make any direct transfer to children.
Observe that, while we study a mechanism design problem, the policy can be imple-
9The problem considered by Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) has a similar structure. They analyze
nonlinear taxation of a monopolist that in turn uses nonlinear pricing.
10The “intermediate” case where only parents have full information is also of some interest. However,
since the insight it provides is not directly related to our main results, we restrict ourselves to presenting
it in an Appendix.
16
mented by a suitably designed mix of LTC benefits and taxes. The mix depends on the
precise timing and more specifically on whether τ is interpreted as a gift or a bequest.
So far we have been agnostic about this because it was of no relevance. When τ is a gift
and thus precedes the public transfer g, the solution can be implemented simply by a
function g(τ) conditioning LTC benefits on τ . When τ is a bequest, which by definition
occurs after g is consumed, we can condition LTC on a reported (planned) τ , but then
we have to make sure that parents stick to one of the pairs (τ , g) or (τ , g). In particular
we have to prevent parents from picking a pair, but then leaving a larger bequest (in
order to “buy” more care). This can be done by a nonlinear tax on bequest which is
prohibitively large when τ deviates from the one associated with the level of public LTC
consumed. In practice this means that “excess” public transfers can be recovered from
an individual’s bequest.
4.1 Full information solution
In this section, we assume that both parents and the government have full information
concerning the children’s types. Transfer τ are also publicly observable. However, a is
observed by parents only. The government sets g, g, τ , τ , anticipating the choices of the
parents. Parents choose s ex ante to maximize their expected utility, and set a such
that τ − v(a, β) = 0; we can thus define af (τ, β) as the solution to this equation. We
have
∂af
∂τ
=
1
va
,
∂af
∂β
= −vβ
va
> 0.
Parents also .
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The government now maximizes
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gff =wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g)
]
.
(18)
The FOCs of the government are
∂Gff
∂g
= −pi(1− λ) + pi(1− λ)H ′(m) = 0,
∂Gff
∂g
= −piλ+ piλH ′(m) = 0,
∂Gff
∂τ
= pi(1− λ)H ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (19)
∂Gff
∂τ
= piλH ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (20)
and parents choose s so that
∂Gff
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (21)
Combining these equations yields
H ′(m) = H ′(m) = U(s) = 1,
and
va(a, β) = va(a, β) = 1.
These expressions have a simple interpretation. With full information, a nonuniform
LTC policy can provide full insurance not only against the risk of dependence, but
also against the risk of having high-cost children. Informal care a is set at the efficient
levels for each type of children. We now turn to the case where neither parents nor the
government observe the children’s types. The “intermediate” case where only parents
have full information is also of some interest. It is presented in Appendix A.2, which
can be skipped without affecting the readability of the following sections.
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4.2 Asymmetric information
When neither the parents nor the government can observe the children’s types, the
government proposes a menu
(
(τ , g), (τ , g)
)
. The only choice left to parents is to fix
the level of a associated with each option. As long as τ > τ , parents set these levels of
informal care such that the participation constraint of β and the incentive constraint of
β are satisfied. Formally, the levels of a are defined by
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
,
and
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
+ v
(
aas, β
)− v (aas, β) .
The optimal (nonuniform) LTC policy is then determined by solving the following prob-
lem11
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gaa =α{wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g)]}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(aas, β)− v(aas, β)]
s.t. τ = v
(
aas, β
)
, (24)
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
+ v
(
aas, β
)− v (aas, β) , (25)
τ ≥ τ . (26)
To solve this problem, we will first ignore constraint (26). We will then verify ex post
if the solution to the unconstrained problem fulfils this constraint. If this is the case,
11 We will ignore for the moment the IC constraints of the parents, which are given by
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g) ≥ H(s+ aas − τ + g) (22)
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g) ≥ H(s+ aas(τ , β)− τ + g), (23)
where τ = v(aas(τ , β), β). In words, since parents have private information on the level of informal
care, the social planner has to ensure that they will not prefer a contract over the other, and propose a
pooling contract to the children. In Footnote 12, we show that these constraints are indeed not binding.
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we can indeed ignore the constraint. If not a pooling equilibrium emerges. Substituting
(24) and (25) in the objective function, the problem can be rewritten as
max
g,g,a,a
Gaa =α{wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ piλH(s+ a− v (a, β)+ g)
+ pi(1− λ)H(s+ a− v (a, β)− v (a, β)+ v (a, β)+ g)}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)].
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaa
∂g
= −pi(1− λ) + pi(1− λ)H ′(m) = 0, (27)
∂Gaa
∂g
= −piλ+ piλH ′(m) = 0, (28)
∂Gaa
∂a
= pi(1− λ)H ′(m) [1− va(a, β)] = 0, (29)
∂Gaa
∂a
= piαλH ′(m)
[
1− va(a, β)
]− pi (1− λ) [αH ′(m)− (1− α)] [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0.
(30)
Conditions (27) and (28), combined with the parents’ FOC with respect to savings imply
that
U ′ (s) = H ′(m) = H ′(m) = 1
Then, we have m = m implying that, under asymmetric information, the optimal
nonuniform LTC insurance scheme provides full insurance not only against the risk of
dependence, but also against the uncertainty associated with informal care. This is in
stark contrast with the results obtained with a uniform policy where full insurance could
not be achieved.
Informal care is set at its first best level for low-cost children, as it is shown in (29).
Conversely, the optimal level of informal care provided by high-cost children is distorted.
Combining (29) with (28) and (30) shows that an interior solution for a is determined
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by
λα
[
1− va(a, β)
]− (1− λ) (2α− 1) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0. (31)
Since va decreases in β, the direction of the distortion depends on the sign of (2α− 1).
If children have a lower weight than parents in the social welfare function (α > 1/2),
then a is distorted downward. If parents and children have the same weight, (α = 1/2),
there will be no distortion of informal care. Intuitively, the rent is purely a transfer in
this case, since the social marginal utility of consumption is the same for children and
parents. Finally, if children have a higher weight than parents, there will be an upward
distortion of informal care.
The optimal LTC transfer is higher the lower the level of bequests (and the lower the
level of informal care). To see this, consider the allocation characterized by (27)–(30).
Since individuals are fully insured, m = m, which implies
g(τ) ≤ g(τ) ⇐⇒ a− τ ≥ a− τ .
Using the IC and PC of the children, this can be rewritten as
g(τ) ≤ g(τ) ⇐⇒ a− v(a, β) ≥ a− v(a, β),
which is always true since a = arg maxx x−v(x, β). Then, the optimal separating policy
g(τ) implies higher transfers to the parents of high-cost children, in order to compensate
them for the lower level of informal care they receive.12
The allocation characterized above is a solution to the government’s problem only
if it satisfies (26). Denote a∗ and a∗ the solutions to (31) and (29). Differentiating (31)
shows that a∗ always decreases in α (and thus increases in children’s weight 1 − α),
irrespective of the degree of risk aversion of the parents.13 If children have no weight in
12This solution implies m = m so that the parents’ IC constraints (22) and (23) stated in Footnote
11 are satisfied.
13Differentiating (31), one obtains that the sign of ∂a∗/∂α is equal to the sign of
λ
[
1− va(a, β)
]− 2 (1− λ) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] ,
which is always negative under (31) since (2α− 1)/α ≤ 1 for all α ≤ 1.
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the social welfare function (α = 1), then a is distorted downwards, so that a∗ < a∗. If
α = 0, then the LHS of (31) is always positive. In this case there is a corner solution
with a∗ = amax ≥ a∗, where amax is the maximum level of informal care that can be
provided by children. Then, there exist a threshold α̂ = (1−λ)/(2−λ) < 1/2 such that
the optimal policy implies a = a∗ ≤ a∗ if and only if α ≥ α̂.14 Using (24) and (25) it
follows that this solution satisfies constraint (26).
When α < α̂ we have a∗ > a∗, which violates constraint (26), since
τ = v
(
a∗, β
)
> v
(
a∗, β
)
+ v
(
a∗, β
)− v (a∗, β) = τ ,
whenever a∗ > a∗. In this case, the optimal policy consists in a pooling contract {τp, gp}.
Observe that, since α̂ < 1/2, pooling requires that children receive a larger weight than
parents in social welfare.
To complete the analysis let us now determine this pooling equilibrium. Under this
contract parents set ap such that τp = v(ap, β) and the government’s problem can be
written as
max
g,a
Gaap =α{wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piH(s+ a− v (a, β)+ g)}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)].
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaap
∂g
= −pi + piH ′ = 0, (32)
∂Gaap
∂a
= piαH ′
[
1− va(a, β)
]
+ pi (1− λ) (1− α) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0. (33)
Condition (32) yields H ′ = 1. This, combined with the FOC of the parents, implies
1 = U ′(s) = H ′(m) so that we continue to have full insurance against both the risk of
dependence and the risk of having a high-cost child. Furthermore, (33) can be rewritten
as [
1− va(ap, β)
]
+ (1− λ) (1− α)
α
[
va(a
p, β)− va(ap, β)
]
= 0.
14The threshold α̂ is the value of α such that (31) is satisfied for a = a∗.
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Differentiating this expression and making use of the SOC show that ∂ap/∂α < 0 so
that under the pooling contract informal care continues to increase with the weight of
children in the social welfare function.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where children’s cost of providing care is not observ-
able and where LTC benefits g can be conditioned on the transfer τ paid by parents to
children in exchange for informal care. Informal care is observable only to parents. The
optimal LTC policy may involve a separating or a pooling contract. This policy is such
that:
(i) The risk of having high-cost children is fully insured.
(ii) The average level of informal care always increases in the weight of children in the
social welfare function, irrespective of the parents’ degree of risk aversion.
(iii) A separating contract is optimal if and only if α ≥ (1 − λ)/(2 − λ) < 1/2. It
implies that:
(a) Informal care is set at its first best level for the low-cost children.
(b) The level of informal care provided by high-cost children is distorted and the
direction of the distortion depends on children’s weight in the welfare function.
It has the same sign as (2α−1) so that a downward (upward) distortion occurs
when the weight of the children is lower (higher) than the weight of parents.
Note that, while with a uniform policy the results crucially depend on parents’ risk
aversion, this is no longer true when the policy is restricted by informational consid-
erations only, and can be nonuniform. In that case the available policy instruments
are sufficiently powerful to ensure that parents are always fully insured, even against
the risk of having high-cost children. And since they are fully insured, risk aversion no
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longer matters. Even more strikingly, the tradeoff between the provision of insurance
to parents and the concern for the welfare of the caregivers which drives the results for
a uniform policy is no longer relevant under nonuniform policies.
5 Conclusion
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when informal care from children to
dependent parents is due to a bequest motive. Parents do not observe their children’s
cost of providing care, but they can commit to a bequests rule specifying a transfer
conditional on the level of informal care. The social welfare function is a weighted
sum of parents’ and children’s utility. We show that social LTC insurance affects the
exchanges between parents and children and in particular the level of informal care and
the distribution of rents.
The optimal uniform public LTC insurance depends on the attitude towards risk
of parents. Under DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) preferences, public LTC
insurance exacerbates the distortion of informal care. Consequently, the optimal public
LTC coverage provides less than full insurance. The opposite is true under IARA
(increasing absolute risk aversion) preferences. A uniform policy can never insure the
risk of having a high-cost child.
A nonuniform policy that conditions LTC benefits on bequests provides full insur-
ance even for the risk of having high-cost children. The level of informal care provided by
high-cost children is distorted and the direction of the distortion depends on children’s
weight in the social welfare function.
Interestingly, in the uniform as well as in the nonuniform case, the higher the weight
of children in the social welfare function, the higher the optimal average level of informal
care. This apparently counter-intuitive result is due to the exchange motive behind
family help. Under this motive, higher reliance on the family for the provision of long-
term care implies higher rents for children. In our model, crowding out of family help by
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public care only affects social welfare through its (negative) effect on children’s utility.
A main lesson that emerges from our analysis is that in an exchange-based setting,
social insurance should be designed in order to ensure that dependent elderly have to
rely even on high-cost children. This ensures that low-cost children get rewarded for
the informal care they provide.
Another major lesson is that, even with ex ante identical individuals, the nonuniform
policy performs better and is able to provide full insurance against both underlying
risks. In other words, even with identical individuals, social LTC should involve some
measure of means testing and/or recover part of the benefits received by the elderly
from their estate. This results is interesting because means testing is usually justified
by redistribution. We have not considered redistributive motive, but they could only
be expected to reinforce this result.
Throughout the paper we have remained agnostic about the exact nature of the
transfer, gift or bequest, that “pays” for the care, except that we have pointed out
that it affects the timing of the underlying game. From and empirical perspective,
however, the gift interpretation appears to be more compelling. The literature has
found some evidence that inter vivos transfers are larger for those children who provide
informal care (Norton and Van Houtven, 2006). However, these estimates are often
problematic because of endogeneity problems and because measurement of both informal
care and financial transfers within the family is difficult. More reliable estimates require
longitudinal data and a step in that direction is taken by Norton et al. (2014) who use
the 1999 and 2003 waves of National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and show
that children providing informal care are indeed more likely to receive financial transfers
from their parents.
Considering bequests as payment for care is more problematic because research
has shown that bequests are typically divided equally among children (Menchik, 1980;
Tomes, 1981). Even when children provide unequal amounts of informal care, bequests
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tend to be divided equally (Norton and Taylor, 2005). This is true for the US but the
argument is even more compelling for most European countries, where equal sharing
rules are imposed by law. In any event there are also theoretical arguments that favor
inter vivos transfers over bequests as payment for informal care. Gifts are more flexible
and, as argued by Norton and Van Houtven (2006), “can be adjusted quickly to the
amount of care, are less costly than writing a will, and can be kept secret from other
family members and the public”.
Our policy recommendations are made under the assumption that the provision of
informal care is exchange-based. This hypothesis has received empirical support and
appears to apply to certain families. Roughly speaking, “. . . the idea of exchange makes
sense for those extended families where an older person has money and needs help, and
a younger person has time and needs money”, (Norton et al. 2014). But it is clearly not
the only behavioral pattern that is relevant. In reality the different types of intra-family
relations, based on altruism, norms or selfish exchanges, with and without commitment
are likely to coexist.15 The different studies provide partial and intermediate answers
which can provide valuable guidance for the design of social LTC policy, as long as
interpreted with suitable care and keeping in mind the underlying assumptions.
15Alternative approaches explored for instance by Cremer and Roeder (2017) Barrigozzi et al. (2017),
Canta and Pestieau (2014), Ponthie`re (2014).
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since a is independent off g, we can focus on the FOCs (13) and (14) to study the
comparative statics with respect to g. Using subscripts to denote partial derivative,
define
H =
[
P asaa P
as
sa
P asas P
as
ss
]
,
and
D =
[ −P asag
−P assg
]
,
where
P assa = P
as
as = pi[λH
′′
(m)(1− v(a, β)− (1− λ)H ′′(m)(va(a, β)− va(a, β))] = piA, (A.1)
P asss = (1− pi)U
′′
(s) + pi[λH
′′
(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)], (A.2)
P asag = pi
{
λH
′′
(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]
}
= piA, (A.3)
P assg = pi[λH
′′
(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)], (A.4)
and where
A = λH
′′
(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]. (A.5)
Using Cramer’s rule we obtain
∂a
∂g
=
∣∣∣∣ −P asag P assa−P assg P asss
∣∣∣∣
|H| ,
where |H| > 0 from the SOC.
Substituting from (A.1)–(A.4), evaluating the determinant and simplifying succes-
sively yields
sgn
(
∂a
∂g
)
= sgn
(∣∣∣∣ −Api Apipi[λH ′′(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)] (1− pi)U ′′(s) + pi[λH ′′(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)]
∣∣∣∣)
= sgn
(−piA[(1− pi)u′′(s)]) = sgn(A).
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To sum up we have to study the sign of A defined by (A.5). Substituting from (15) and
rearranging yields
A = (1− λ)∆vA
[
H ′′(m)
H ′(m)
H ′(m)
−H ′′(m)
]
.
Because ∆vA > 0, this expression has the same sign as the term in brackets on the RHS.
Consequently we have
A > 0 ⇐⇒ H
′′(m)
H ′(m)
>
H
′′
(m)
H ′(m)
⇐⇒ −H
′′(m)
H ′(m)
< −H
′′
(m)
H ′(m)
.
Since m < m this is true under IARA (Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion), while DARA
(Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion) yields A < 0.
A.2 Only parents have full information
If the government does not observe β, but parents do, the problem of the government
is given by
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gaf =wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g)
]
s.t. af (τ , β)− τ + g ≥ af (τ , β)− τ + g,
af (τ , β)− τ + g ≥ af (τ , β)− τ + g, (A.6)
where we added the relevant IC constraints to (18). We shall assume that (A.6), the
constraint from the low-cost type to the high-cost type is binding. This constraint is
effectively violated at the full information solution characterized in Section 4.1. To see
this recall that this solution implies
af (τ , β)− τ + g = af (τ , β)− τ + g < af (τ , β)− τ + g,
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so that
g < g + τ − τ + af (τ , β)− af (τ , β),
which violates condition (A.6). Substituting the incentive constraint into Gaf the gov-
ernment’s problem can then be rewritten as
max
g,τ ,τ
Gaf =wT − pi(g + (1− λ)
(
τ − τ + af (τ , β)− af (τ , β)
)
− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ piλH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + pi(1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g).
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaf
∂g
= −pi + pi [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0, (A.7)
∂Gaf
∂τ
= pi(1− λ)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (A.8)
∂Gaf
∂τ
= piλH ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
+ pi (1− λ) (H ′(m)− 1) [∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0.
(A.9)
Recall that af (τ , β) > af (τ , β), which implies m = s + af (τ , β) − τ + g > m = s +
af (τ , β) − τ + g. Hence, condition (A.7) implies that H ′(m) < 1. Furthermore, using
our assumption on af along with (20), which defines τ ff , we have
∂af (τ ff , β)
∂τ
>
∂af (τ ff , β)
∂τ
= 1,
so that at τ ff the first term on the RHS of (A.9) is zero while the second term is
negative, which in turn implies τaf < τ ff (from the SOC). This is not surprising. In
order to relax the IC constraint, the optimal policy distorts τ downwards, which leads
to a downward distortion on a. Conversely, τ and a are not distorted; condition (A.8)
is identical to its full information counterpart (19).
Combining (A.7) with (21), the first-order condition for parents’ saving , yields
U ′ (s) =
[
λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 1
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As in the case with uniform transfers, the optimal LTC policy implies full insurance
against dependence but, under asymmetric information, it is not possible to provide
insurance against the risk of having high-cost children.
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Abstract
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when children differ in their cost
of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to
a “bequests rule” specifying a transfer conditional on the level of informal care. Care
provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards in order to minimize the rent of
low-cost ones. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents’
and children’s utility. The optimal uniform public LTC provision strikes a balance
between insurance and children’s utility. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion less
than full insurance is provided to mitigate the distortion on informal care which reduces
children’s rents. A nonuniform policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides
full insurance even against the risk of having children with a high cost of providing
care. Quite surprisingly the level of informal care induced by the optimal (uniform or
nonuniform) policy always increases in the children’s’ welfare weight.
JEL classification: H2, H5, I13, J14.
Keywords: Long-term care, informal care, strategic bequests, asymmetric information.
1 Introduction
Old age dependence and the need for long-term care (LTC) it brings about represents
a major societal challenge in most developed countries. Due to population ageing the
number of dependent elderly with cognitive and physical impairments will increase dra-
matically during the decades to come (Cremer et al., 2012). Dependence represents a
significant financial risk of which only a small part is typically covered by social in-
surance. Private insurance markets are also thin. Instead, individuals rely on their
savings or on informal care provided by family members. Currently the family is the
main provider and informal care represents roughly 2/3 of total care (Norton, 2000).
Informal provision has no direct bearing on public finances, but it is not available to
everyone. Whether this solidarity is sustainable at its current level is an important
question. Sources of concerns are numerous. The drastic change in family values, the
increasing number of childless households, the mobility of children, the increasing labor
participation of women are as many factors explaining why the number of dependent
elderly who cannot count on family solidarity, at least not for the full amount of care
they need, is increasing. Furthermore, it is not clear if the important role played by
informal care is desirable. Its real costs are often “hidden”. In particular, it may indeed
impose a significant burden on the caregivers which is both financial and psychological.1
In a nutshell, the current situation is inefficient as it leaves some elderly without
proper care and often imposes a considerable burden on caregivers. This market failure
creates a potential role of public intervention through social LTC provision or insurance.
However, the public LTC policy will interact with informal care, and more generally
with the exchanges within the family; consequently, policy design has to account for the
induced changes in transfers within the family.
Informal care can be motivated by some form of altruism, result from implicit ex-
changes or be “imposed” by social norms. Knowing the foundation of informal care is
1On the costs borne by caregivers, see Colombo et al. (2011) or Coe and Van Houtven (2009).
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very important in order to predict how family assistance will react to the emergence of
private or public schemes of LTC insurance.
In this paper we consider a setting where children can provide informal care to
dependent parents, and intergenerational exchanges are based on a care vs. bequest
(or gift) exchange. Children differ in their preferences, which determine their cost
(disutility) of providing informal care. This heterogeneity reflects the fact that the level
of informal care that can be obtained from the family in case of dependence depends on
a number of factors such as the presence of children, their proximity, working situations,
marital status, and the strength of family bonds.
Our framework is inspired by the strategic bequest approach,2 but it differs from the
conventional model in a crucial way in that parents do not perfectly know their children’s
preferences and their cost of providing informal care. Like in the conventional model we
assume that parents can commit to a bequest rule specifying a transfer, gift or bequests,
conditional on the level of informal care provided. However, because of the asymmetry
of information, this does no longer allow them to extract the full surplus generated by
the exchange from their children. Even though parents can use nonlinear rules to screen
for the children’s cost parameter, they will have to leave a positive rent to some of the
children.
In the laissez-faire, the help provided by high-cost children is distorted downwards
in order to mitigate the rent enjoyed by the low-cost ones. Parents are not insured
against the risk of dependence, nor against the risk that their children have a high cost
of providing care.
We then introduce social LTC in this setting. It is designed to maximize a weighted
sum of parent’s and children’s utilities. In other words we explicitly account for the
wellbeing of caregivers. This further differentiates our paper from most of the literature,
which has to a large extent concentrated on parents’ welfare.3 To concentrate on LTC
2See for instance Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Bernheim et al. (1985).
3Barigozzi et al. (2017) also account for the welfare of caregivers, but consider a different type of
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policies we assume throughout the paper that the government cannot make any direct
transfers to the children.
In the first part of the paper we consider a uniform social LTC policy. It provides to
all dependent individuals a given LTC transfer, which is financed by a uniform lump-
sum tax. We show that this policy affects distortions of informal care and thus the
distribution of rents between parents and children. The optimal policy then involves a
tradeoff between providing insurance to parents and enhancing the utility of the care-
givers. In the absence of informal care, social LTC insurance should fully insure the risk
of dependence. With informal care and strategic bequests, the optimal public LTC pol-
icy depends on the attitude towards risk of parents. Under DARA (decreasing absolute
risk aversion) preferences, public LTC insurance exacerbates the distortion of informal
care. Better insurance coverage makes dependent parents less reliant on informal care,
so that distorting down informal care is not too costly for them. Consequently, under
DARA, the optimal public LTC policy provides less than full insurance in order to mit-
igate the distortion of informal care and the reduction in (low-cost) children’s utility it
brings about. The opposite is true under IARA (increasing absolute risk aversion) pref-
erences, in which case the government should provide more than full insurance against
the risk of dependence in order to minimize distortions.
In the second part of the paper we consider nonlinear policies, where transfers form
parents to children are publicly observable and LTC benefits can be conditioned on
bequests (or gifts). The LTC policy can then screen for the children’s cost parameter,
even when the level of informal care is observable only to parents. The underlying
problem presents methodological challenges because we have to deal with a “nested”
principal-agent problem. While the policy can screen for the children’s cost of providing
care, this is done only indirectly via the parents. The latter do not observe their child’s
cost of providing care either but since they observe informal care, they have superior
family exchanges based on cooperative bargaining.
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information.
We show that, while with a uniform policy the results crucially depend on parents’
risk aversion, this is no longer true when the policy is restricted by informational con-
siderations only and can be nonuniform. In that case the available policy instruments
are sufficiently powerful to ensure that parents are always fully insured, even against
the risk of having high-cost children. And since they are fully insured, risk aversion no
longer matters. Even more strikingly, the tradeoff between the provision of insurance
to parents and the concern for the welfare of the caregivers which drives the results for
a uniform policy is not longer relevant when nonuniform policies are considered.
One surprising result regarding the impact of social LTC insurance on informal care
emerges in both cases. In most of the literature on LTC, crowding out of informal care
by public care is considered a serious problem. It makes the provision of social LTC
insurance more expensive and possibly even ineffective, when there is full crowding
out. If one accounts for the wellbeing of caregivers the impact of crowding out is more
complex. One might conjecture that is “bad” for parents, but “good” for children, since
it reduces the cost implied by care provision. However, this conjecture does not stand
under closer scrutiny, and is proven wrong or misleading by our results. This is because
in our setting children are paid for their care through gifts or bequests. Under full
information, when care decreases, their compensation is reduced to keep their utility
constant. Crowding out is then irrelevant. Under asymmetric information, on the other
hand, crowding out will reduce the rents of some of the children and thus effectively
decrease their utility, while it increases parents’ welfare. Consequently, the concern
for the wellbeing of caregivers does not imply that LTC policy should aim at reducing
informal care.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. We study the
uniform and the nonlinear LTC policies, in Section 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5
we provide some concluding remarks.
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2 Model
Consider a generation of identical parents. When old they face the risk of being de-
pendent with probability pi, while they are independent and healthy with probability
(1−pi). When young they each have one child, they earn an exogenous labor income of
wT of which they save s. They have preferences over consumption when young, c ≥ 0,
consumption when old and healthy, d ≥ 0, and consumption, including LTC services,
when old and dependent, m ≥ 0. Their preferences are quasilinear in consumption
when young. Risk aversion is introduced through the concavity of second period state
dependent utilities. The parents’ expected utility is given by
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piE [H (m)] ,
with m = s + a − τ(a), where a ≥ 0 is informal care provided by children, while τ(a)
is a transfer (bequest or gift) from parents to children. One can think of m as total
care, that is informal care a plus formal care s− τ(a), the price of which is normalized
to one. We assume that the transfer can be conditioned on informal care and assume
that parents can commit to this bequest rule. This is in line with the strategic bequest
literature. However, our model differs from the traditional literature on exchange based
intergenerational transfers in that we assume that parents may not perfectly observe
their child’s preferences and in particular their cost of providing care. The children’s
heterogeneity in cost is represented by a parameter β which is not publicly observable,
including to parents. Assume that β is distributed over
{
β, β
}
. In other words, β can
only take two values. The low one β occurs with probability λ ∈]0, 1[, while the high
level β occurs with probability (1− λ).
Children’s cost of providing care a to their parents is given by v(a, β), where 0 ≤
a ≤ amax, with va > 0, vβ < 0, vaa > 0, vaβ < 0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives.4 The cost is increasing and convex in the level of informal care. It decreases
4The assumption that there is an upper bound on informal care is quite natural. Furthermore it is
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in β, which amounts to saying that β is the “good type” for whom providing care is
less costly. Furthermore vaβ < 0 implies that the marginal cost of informal care also
decreases with β.
The children’s utility from helping their parents in case of dependence is
Uk = ck − v(a, β) ≥ 0
where children’s consumption ck = τ(a), that is the transfer from their parents.
Children choose a to maximize Uk
τ ′(a) = va(a, β), (1)
and the solution to this problem is denoted a(β). Observe that a also depends on
τ(·), exactly as labor supply depends on the tax function in a Mirrleesian-type optimal
income tax problem.
Anticipating their children’s behavior but not observing β, parents choose s and
τ(a) to maximize their expected utility given by
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(a(β))] .
To solve this problem we consider the equivalent mechanism design problem where
parents parents choose a(β) and τ(β) to maximize
EU = wT − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(β)]
subject to the relevant participation constraints, as well as the incentive constraints.
These constraints which come about when the parents do not observe β will be stated
and explained below.
Within this framework, we study the public provision of LTC benefits financed by
a lump-sum tax on parents’ first-period consumption. In addition, intergenerational
convenient for technical reasons.
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transfers τ may be taxed or subsidized. The policy is determined to maximize social
welfare which is given by a weighted sum of parents’ and children’s expected utilities.
Parents’ weight is α ∈ (0, 1), while children’s utility is weighted by 1− α.
The timing is as follows. The LTC policy is decided upon in stage 1, before parents
and children make their decisions. In stage 2, parents choose their level of savings s
and commit to the bequest rule τ(a). In stage 3, the dependence status of the parents
is realized and children choose a according to (1).
While we concentrate on the asymmetric information case, we start by considering
the full information benchmark, that is the solution parents can achieve when they
observe their children’s cost of providing care. We also characterize the optimal LTC
policy for this benchmark.
3 Uniform LTC benefit
In this section, we restrict the policy to a uniform transfer g financed by a lump-sum tax.
In other words, we consider universal public provision (or subsidization) of LTC. Such
a policy is clearly suboptimal if the government can condition transfers on bequests.5
However, it is relevant in practice, since the government may not be able to observe
bequests. Furthermore, even if the government was able to observe bequests, it may
be politically infeasible to condition g on τ . In this section, we first characterize the
optimal policy when parents can observe their children’s type. We then turn to the
asymmetric information case.
3.1 Full information benchmark
Parent’s choose s and commit to a bequest rule ex ante, that is before the state of
health and β are realized and observed. Since β takes only two values, it is convenient
5In Section 4 we will consider the case where g can be conditioned on bequests, so that the government
can screen for different levels of β.
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to introduce the following notation
τ(β) = τ ; τ(β) = τ ,
a(β) = a ; a(β) = a,
m(β) = m ; τ(β) = m.
Using this notation the parent’s problem can be written as
max
a,a,τ ,τ ,s
wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ a− τ + g)]
s.t. τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0, (2)
τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0. (3)
where pig is the lump-sum tax levied to finance the expected cost of social LTC transfers.
Conditions (2) and (3) represent the children’s participation constraint. While children
take the bequest rule τ(a) as given, they have the option not to exchange with their
parents: in this case there will be no care and no transfer and chilrden’s utility is an
exogenously given constant which without loss of generality is normalized to zero.
Under full information, the parent can extract all the surplus, and both participation
constraints are binding.6 Then, substituting for τ and τ from (2) and (3) the parent’s
problem can be rewritten as
max
a,a,s
P f =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)] .
The first-order conditions (FOC) with respect to the remaining choice variables are
6When a participation constraint is not binding parents can increase the corresponding a and/or
decrease τ , thereby increasing their expected utility.
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given by
∂P f
∂a
= (1− λ)H ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0,
∂P f
∂a
= λH ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0,
∂P f
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (4)
The first two conditions imply
1 = va(a, β) = va(a, β), (5)
which is quite intuitive. Under full information parents have to compensate children
exactly for their utility cost of informal care. Consequently, they equalize marginal costs
to marginal benefits, which are equal to one. Not surprisingly, this implies a > a and
m > m: low-cost children provide more informal care and their parents enjoy a larger
amount of total care, m, in case of dependence. To decentralize this solution parents
must then choose τ so that τ ′(a) = τ ′(a) = 1. Observe that neither a nor a depend on
g. Consequently, a uniform g can never achieve full insurance for the risk associated
with the uncertainty of β; parents with low-cost children are always better off.
We now turn to the government’s problem, which is given by
max
g
Gf =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)] , (6)
where s, a and a are the solutions to the parents’ problem for any given g. Since
the parents have full information, the children’s utility will be zero no matter what.
Consequently, the relative weight of children in social welfare is of no relevance and we
can just as well neglect this term in the welfare function.
Using the envelope theorem (for the induced effect on s) and recalling that the levels
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of a do not depend on g we have7
∂Gf
∂g
= −pi + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0.
Not surprisingly, this condition equalizes marginal costs and benefits of g. Combining
this condition with the parent’s FOC with respect to s in (4) yields
U ′(s) = [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = Eβ[H ′(m)] = 1. (7)
This condition states that the three possible uses of (first-period) income, direct con-
sumption c, deferred consumption s, and LTC insurance, g must have the same marginal
expected utility.
3.2 Asymmetric information
Except for the policy design, the previous section has presented a rather standard strate-
gic bequest model. Parents have all the bargaining power and have full information
about their children’s cost of providing care. We now turn to the more interesting case
where parents do not know their children’s type. We then have to add two incentive
constraints to the parents’ problem. The objective function does not change and the
participation constraints continue of course to apply. The parents’ problem can then be
stated as follows
max
a,a,τ ,τ ,s
P as =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi[λH(s+ a− τ + g)
+ (1− λ)H(s+ a− τ + g)]
s.t. τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0,
τ − v(a, β) ≥ 0,
τ − v(a, β) ≥ τ − v(a, β), (8)
τ − v(a, β) ≥ τ − v(a, β).
7We assume that the second order condition holds.
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This is a rather standard mechanism design problem and one can easily show that we
obtain the “usual” pattern of binding incentive and participation constraints. To be
precise, the participation constraint of high-cost children is binding so that
τ = v(a, β). (9)
Furthermore, the incentive constraint of β, the low-cost type, is binding. Using (9) this
condition can be written as
τ = v(a, β) + [v(a, β)− v(a, β)], (10)
where the term in brackets on the RHS represents the rent of type β. In words, because
low-cost children can mimic high-cost ones and provide a at a lower cost, they have
to receive a transfer exceeding the cost of the care they provide. This is particularly
interesting from our perspective because it implies that the utility of the caregivers is
no longer exogenously given. Some of them now receive a transfers which puts them
above their reservation utility level and this transfer may depend on the LTC policy.
Substituting for the transfers from (9) and (10) into the objective function, the
parents’ problem can then be rewritten as
max
a,a,s
P as =wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β)− v(a, β) + v(a, β) + g)] . (11)
The first-order conditions are given by
∂P as
∂a
= (1− λ)H ′(m)[1− va(a, β)] = 0, (12)
∂P as
∂a
= pi
{
λH ′(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]
}
= 0, (13)
∂P as
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (14)
From equation (12) we obtain 1 = va(a, β), which is the full information condition for
β, the low-cost type; see equation (5). This is the traditional no distortion at the top
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result that, given the quasi-linearity of the utility function, does not only apply to the
rule, but also to the actual level of care a which is the same as in the full information
solution, and continues to be independent of g.
Turning to a, rearranging (13) yields
[1− va(a, β)] = (1− λ)H
′(m)
λH ′(m)
[va(a, β)− va(a, β)] > 0, (15)
where we have used vaβ < 0, which implies ∆va = va(a, β)−va(a, β) > 0. Consequently
we have va(a, β) < 1 implying a downward distortion for a. Intuitively, ∆va > 0
accounts for the fact that the rent of the low-cost type increases with a. The downward
distortion allows parents to mitigate this rent. Equation (15) also implies that a depends
on g, as well as the bequests left to both types, according to (9) and (10). For g = 0,
the solution to the parents’ problem yields the laissez-faire allocation.
We now turn to the government’s problem. Since the parents no longer have full
information, the low-cost children now have a positive utility level. Moreover, their
utility is affected by the LTC policy via its impact on the parents’ optimization problem.
Consequently, the relative weight of children in social welfare is now relevant. When this
weight is strictly positive, the LTC policy strikes a balance between providing insurance
coverage to parents and the concern for the wellbeing of the caregivers.
The government’s problem is given by
max
g
Gas =α{wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + pi [λH(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)
+(1− λ)H(s+ a− v(a, β)− [v(a, β)− v(a, β)] + g)]}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)], (16)
where a, a and s are determined by the solution to the parents’ problem. Observe that
parents’ utility is expressed as the solution to the reformulated problem (11) which is
an unconstrained optimization where the relevant IC and participation constraints have
been substituted into the objective function.
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Using the envelope theorem according to which we can neglect the derivatives of
parents’ utility with respect to a, a, and s, the FOC is given by8
∂Gas
∂g
=α{−pi + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)]}
+ pi(1− λ)(1− α)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]∂a,
∂g
= 0. (17)
Recall that the term ∆va = va(a, β) − va(a, β) is positive. Observe that the children’s
utility does not directly depend on s and that a does not depend on g, nor does the
high-costs children’s utility, which is always equal to zero, the exogenous reservation
utility. Consequently, the only behavioral response to the LTC policy that is relevant in
(17) is ∂a, /∂g which measures how g affects the level of care provided by the high-cost
children. The sign of this expression will in turn determine how the level of care affects
the caregivers’ utility.
Consider first the case where the caregivers’ utility is not included in social welfare,
that is α = 1. Using the parent’s FOC, expression (17) can be written as
U ′(s) = [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 1.
This is the same rule as the one under full information that was given by (7). In both
cases we have U ′(s) = 1 so that the level of s is also the same. However, the levels of
m will differ from the full information solution, which in turn implies that the level of
g will also in general be different, even though the rule is the same.
We use superscripts f and as to refer to the solutions to the full information and
asymmetric information problems, specified by (6) and (16) respectively. Suppose that
gas = gf . Then, λH ′(mas) + (1− λ)H ′(mas) > 1 , because mas < mf (as a is distorted
downward) and mas < mf (as low-cost children receive a positive rent); consequently
we must have gas > gf : the optimal level of LTC benefits is larger under asymmetric
information than under full information. Intuitively, g is higher to compensate in part
for the downward distortion in a that parents create to mitigate children’s rents.
8We assume that the second order condition holds.
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Let us now turn to the case where α < 1, which includes the utilitarian case where
α = 1/2. In this case g is no longer solely determined to provide insurance to parents.
The optimal LTC policy also accounts for the impact of g on informal care and thus on
children’s utility (rents). Roughly speaking, when ∂a/∂g > 0 one can expect that the
effect described for α = 1 is reinforced by the effect of g on children’s rents. Since rents
increase in a, increasing g increases rents. In this case we have gas > gf . Conversely,
when ∂a/∂g < 0, the two effects go in opposite directions. Either way this discussion
shows that as soon as α < 1 the results will crucially depend on the sign of ∂a/∂g. The
study of this sign requires a closer look at the comparative statics of the parents’ problem
under asymmetric information. The following lemma is established in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 When the parents’ utility in case of dependence H(m) exhibits DARA we
have ∂a/∂g < 0; when H(m) exhibits IARA we have ∂a/∂g > 0.
This lemma shows that the effect of g (via the parents’ problem) on the level of
care provided by the high-cost children depends on the parents’ attitude towards risk.
Intuitively our results can be understood as follows. With DARA, as g increases, parents
become less risk averse. Then, reducing m in the bad state of nature becomes less costly
for them, and distorting a downwards becomes more attractive. The case with IARA
is exactly symmetrical. Note that empirically DARA appears to receive more support
(Friend and Blume, 1975).
Using equation (17) and Lemma 1 we can study the effect of α on gas(α). For
instance, we can compare the utilitarian level gas(1/2) with gas(1), the level achieved
when children are not accounted for in the social welfare function. With DARA we know
from Lemma 1 that a decreases as g increases, which in turn implies that the utility of
the low-cost child decreases; recall that ∆va > 0. Consequently equation (17) evaluated
at gas(1) is negative so that gas(1/2) < gas(1). Under IARA these effects are reversed
and we obtain gas(1/2) > gas(1). This result also goes through for intermediate levels
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of α. Totally differentiating (17) and rearranging yields
∂g
∂α
=
(1−λ)
α [va(a, β)− va(a, β)]∂a∂g
SOC
,
which has the opposite sign of ∂a/∂g. Accordingly, under DARA g increases in α, while
it decreases as α increases under IARA.
Using the FOC of the parents with respect to s, (14), equation (17) implies that,
whenever α < 1
U ′(s) < 1 < Eβ(H ′(m)) if ∂a/∂g < 0,
and
U ′(s) > 1 > Eβ(H ′(m)) if ∂a/∂g > 0.
Intuitively, the utility of dependent parents is distorted down with respect to the full
information case under DARA. In this case, providing full insurance against the risk
of dependence would push parents to cut the utility of low-cost children (by distorting
down a). From the perspective of social welfare, there is a then a tradeoff between
insurance and children’s utility, leading to less than full insurance. Accordingly, parents
have an incentive to save more and this increases their consumption if healthy. Under
IARA these effects are reversed.
The results obtained in this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the case where the children’s cost of providing care is not
observable and where public policy is restricted to a uniform LTC benefit g financed by
a lump-sum tax. Informal care is observable only by parents. The optimal LTC policy
is such that:
(i) The risk of having children with a high cost of providing care is not fully insured;
(ii) If children’s utility has no weight in social welfare, parents are fully insured
against dependence. This is achieved through a uniform benefit that is larger than in
the full information case.
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(iii) If the weight of children in social welfare is strictly positive, and the parent’s
utility in case of dependence H(m) exhibits DARA, parents are less than fully insured
against dependence. The uniform benefit decreases with the weight of children in social
welfare.
(iv) If the weight of children in social welfare is strictly positive, and H(m) exhibits
IARA, parents are more than fully insured against dependence. The uniform benefit is
higher than under full information and it increases with the weight of children in social
welfare.
4 Nonlinear policies
We now consider nonlinear policies under which the level of LTC transfers g can be
conditioned on τ , which is publicly observable. The LTC policy can then screen for
the children’s cost parameter β. We continue to assume that a is observable only to
parents. The underlying problem presents methodological challenges because we have
to deal with a “nested” principal-agent problem.9 While the policy can screen for β,
this is done only indirectly via the parents. The latter do not observe their child’s β
either but since they observe informal care, they have superior information.
We proceed exactly like in the previous section. We start with the full information
solution and then concentrate on the case where neither the parents nor the government
can observe the children’s type β.10 Parents observe a but the government does not.
The policy we study consists of a menu of LTC benefits and bequests pairs. Under
asymmetric information parents self-select into a benefit-bequest pair. We will also
continue to assume that the government cannot make any direct transfer to children.
Observe that, while we study a mechanism design problem, the policy can be imple-
9The problem considered by Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) has a similar structure. They analyze
nonlinear taxation of a monopolist that in turn uses nonlinear pricing.
10The “intermediate” case where only parents have full information is also of some interest. However,
since the insight it provides is not directly related to our main results, we restrict ourselves to presenting
it in an Appendix.
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mented by a suitably designed mix of LTC benefits and taxes. The mix depends on the
precise timing and more specifically on whether τ is interpreted as a gift or a bequest.
So far we have been agnostic about this because it was of no relevance. When τ is a gift
and thus precedes the public transfer g, the solution can be implemented simply by a
function g(τ) conditioning LTC benefits on τ . When τ is a bequest, which by definition
occurs after g is consumed, we can condition LTC on a reported (planned) τ , but then
we have to make sure that parents stick to one of the pairs (τ , g) or (τ , g). In particular
we have to prevent parents from picking a pair, but then leaving a larger bequest (in
order to “buy” more care). This can be done by a nonlinear tax on bequest which is
prohibitively large when τ deviates from the one associated with the level of public LTC
consumed. In practice this means that “excess” public transfers can be recovered from
an individual’s bequest.
4.1 Full information solution
In this section, we assume that both parents and the government have full information
concerning the children’s types. Transfer τ are also publicly observable. However, a is
observed by parents only. The government sets g, g, τ , τ , anticipating the choices of the
parents. Parents choose s ex ante to maximize their expected utility, and set a such
that τ − v(a, β) = 0; we can thus define af (τ, β) as the solution to this equation. We
have
∂af
∂τ
=
1
va
,
∂af
∂β
= −vβ
va
> 0.
Parents also .
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The government now maximizes
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gff =wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g)
]
.
(18)
The FOCs of the government are
∂Gff
∂g
= −pi(1− λ) + pi(1− λ)H ′(m) = 0,
∂Gff
∂g
= −piλ+ piλH ′(m) = 0,
∂Gff
∂τ
= pi(1− λ)H ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (19)
∂Gff
∂τ
= piλH ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (20)
and parents choose s so that
∂Gff
∂s
= −1 + (1− pi)U ′(s) + pi[λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0. (21)
Combining these equations yields
H ′(m) = H ′(m) = U(s) = 1,
and
va(a, β) = va(a, β) = 1.
These expressions have a simple interpretation. With full information, a nonuniform
LTC policy can provide full insurance not only against the risk of dependence, but
also against the risk of having high-cost children. Informal care a is set at the efficient
levels for each type of children. We now turn to the case where neither parents nor the
government observe the children’s types. The “intermediate” case where only parents
have full information is also of some interest. It is presented in Appendix A.2, which
can be skipped without affecting the readability of the following sections.
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4.2 Asymmetric information
When neither the parents nor the government can observe the children’s types, the
government proposes a menu
(
(τ , g), (τ , g)
)
. The only choice left to parents is to fix
the level of a associated with each option. As long as τ > τ , parents set these levels of
informal care such that the participation constraint of β and the incentive constraint of
β are satisfied. Formally, the levels of a are defined by
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
,
and
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
+ v
(
aas, β
)− v (aas, β) .
The optimal (nonuniform) LTC policy is then determined by solving the following prob-
lem11
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gaa =α{wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g)]}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(aas, β)− v(aas, β)]
s.t. τ = v
(
aas, β
)
, (24)
τ = v
(
aas, β
)
+ v
(
aas, β
)− v (aas, β) , (25)
τ ≥ τ . (26)
To solve this problem, we will first ignore constraint (26). We will then verify ex post
if the solution to the unconstrained problem fulfils this constraint. If this is the case,
11 We will ignore for the moment the IC constraints of the parents, which are given by
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g) ≥ H(s+ aas − τ + g) (22)
λH(s+ aas − τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ aas − τ + g) ≥ H(s+ aas(τ , β)− τ + g), (23)
where τ = v(aas(τ , β), β). In words, since parents have private information on the level of informal
care, the social planner has to ensure that they will not prefer a contract over the other, and propose a
pooling contract to the children. In Footnote 12, we show that these constraints are indeed not binding.
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we can indeed ignore the constraint. If not a pooling equilibrium emerges. Substituting
(24) and (25) in the objective function, the problem can be rewritten as
max
g,g,a,a
Gaa =α{wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ piλH(s+ a− v (a, β)+ g)
+ pi(1− λ)H(s+ a− v (a, β)− v (a, β)+ v (a, β)+ g)}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)].
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaa
∂g
= −pi(1− λ) + pi(1− λ)H ′(m) = 0, (27)
∂Gaa
∂g
= −piλ+ piλH ′(m) = 0, (28)
∂Gaa
∂a
= pi(1− λ)H ′(m) [1− va(a, β)] = 0, (29)
∂Gaa
∂a
= piαλH ′(m)
[
1− va(a, β)
]− pi (1− λ) [αH ′(m)− (1− α)] [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0.
(30)
Conditions (27) and (28), combined with the parents’ FOC with respect to savings imply
that
U ′ (s) = H ′(m) = H ′(m) = 1
Then, we have m = m implying that, under asymmetric information, the optimal
nonuniform LTC insurance scheme provides full insurance not only against the risk of
dependence, but also against the uncertainty associated with informal care. This is in
stark contrast with the results obtained with a uniform policy where full insurance could
not be achieved.
Informal care is set at its first best level for low-cost children, as it is shown in (29).
Conversely, the optimal level of informal care provided by high-cost children is distorted.
Combining (29) with (28) and (30) shows that an interior solution for a is determined
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by
λα
[
1− va(a, β)
]− (1− λ) (2α− 1) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0. (31)
Since va decreases in β, the direction of the distortion depends on the sign of (2α− 1).
If children have a lower weight than parents in the social welfare function (α > 1/2),
then a is distorted downward. If parents and children have the same weight, (α = 1/2),
there will be no distortion of informal care. Intuitively, the rent is purely a transfer in
this case, since the social marginal utility of consumption is the same for children and
parents. Finally, if children have a higher weight than parents, there will be an upward
distortion of informal care.
The optimal LTC transfer is higher the lower the level of bequests (and the lower the
level of informal care). To see this, consider the allocation characterized by (27)–(30).
Since individuals are fully insured, m = m, which implies
g(τ) ≤ g(τ) ⇐⇒ a− τ ≥ a− τ .
Using the IC and PC of the children, this can be rewritten as
g(τ) ≤ g(τ) ⇐⇒ a− v(a, β) ≥ a− v(a, β),
which is always true since a = arg maxx x−v(x, β). Then, the optimal separating policy
g(τ) implies higher transfers to the parents of high-cost children, in order to compensate
them for the lower level of informal care they receive.12
The allocation characterized above is a solution to the government’s problem only
if it satisfies (26). Denote a∗ and a∗ the solutions to (31) and (29). Differentiating (31)
shows that a∗ always decreases in α (and thus increases in children’s weight 1 − α),
irrespective of the degree of risk aversion of the parents.13 If children have no weight in
12This solution implies m = m so that the parents’ IC constraints (22) and (23) stated in Footnote
11 are satisfied.
13Differentiating (31), one obtains that the sign of ∂a∗/∂α is equal to the sign of
λ
[
1− va(a, β)
]− 2 (1− λ) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] ,
which is always negative under (31) since (2α− 1)/α ≤ 1 for all α ≤ 1.
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the social welfare function (α = 1), then a is distorted downwards, so that a∗ < a∗. If
α = 0, then the LHS of (31) is always positive. In this case there is a corner solution
with a∗ = amax ≥ a∗, where amax is the maximum level of informal care that can be
provided by children. Then, there exist a threshold α̂ = (1−λ)/(2−λ) < 1/2 such that
the optimal policy implies a = a∗ ≤ a∗ if and only if α ≥ α̂.14 Using (24) and (25) it
follows that this solution satisfies constraint (26).
When α < α̂ we have a∗ > a∗, which violates constraint (26), since
τ = v
(
a∗, β
)
> v
(
a∗, β
)
+ v
(
a∗, β
)− v (a∗, β) = τ ,
whenever a∗ > a∗. In this case, the optimal policy consists in a pooling contract {τp, gp}.
Observe that, since α̂ < 1/2, pooling requires that children receive a larger weight than
parents in social welfare.
To complete the analysis let us now determine this pooling equilibrium. Under this
contract parents set ap such that τp = v(ap, β) and the government’s problem can be
written as
max
g,a
Gaap =α{wT − pig − s+ (1− pi)U (s) + piH(s+ a− v (a, β)+ g)}
+ (1− α)pi(1− λ)[v(a, β)− v(a, β)].
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaap
∂g
= −pi + piH ′ = 0, (32)
∂Gaap
∂a
= piαH ′
[
1− va(a, β)
]
+ pi (1− λ) (1− α) [va(a, β)− va(a, β)] = 0. (33)
Condition (32) yields H ′ = 1. This, combined with the FOC of the parents, implies
1 = U ′(s) = H ′(m) so that we continue to have full insurance against both the risk of
dependence and the risk of having a high-cost child. Furthermore, (33) can be rewritten
as [
1− va(ap, β)
]
+ (1− λ) (1− α)
α
[
va(a
p, β)− va(ap, β)
]
= 0.
14The threshold α̂ is the value of α such that (31) is satisfied for a = a∗.
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Differentiating this expression and making use of the SOC show that ∂ap/∂α < 0 so
that under the pooling contract informal care continues to increase with the weight of
children in the social welfare function.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where children’s cost of providing care is not observ-
able and where LTC benefits g can be conditioned on the transfer τ paid by parents to
children in exchange for informal care. Informal care is observable only to parents. The
optimal LTC policy may involve a separating or a pooling contract. This policy is such
that:
(i) The risk of having high-cost children is fully insured.
(ii) The average level of informal care always increases in the weight of children in the
social welfare function, irrespective of the parents’ degree of risk aversion.
(iii) A separating contract is optimal if and only if α ≥ (1 − λ)/(2 − λ) < 1/2. It
implies that:
(a) Informal care is set at its first best level for the low-cost children.
(b) The level of informal care provided by high-cost children is distorted and the
direction of the distortion depends on children’s weight in the welfare function.
It has the same sign as (2α−1) so that a downward (upward) distortion occurs
when the weight of the children is lower (higher) than the weight of parents.
Note that, while with a uniform policy the results crucially depend on parents’ risk
aversion, this is no longer true when the policy is restricted by informational consid-
erations only, and can be nonuniform. In that case the available policy instruments
are sufficiently powerful to ensure that parents are always fully insured, even against
the risk of having high-cost children. And since they are fully insured, risk aversion no
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longer matters. Even more strikingly, the tradeoff between the provision of insurance
to parents and the concern for the welfare of the caregivers which drives the results for
a uniform policy is no longer relevant under nonuniform policies.
5 Conclusion
We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policy when informal care from children to
dependent parents is due to a bequest motive. Parents do not observe their children’s
cost of providing care, but they can commit to a bequests rule specifying a transfer
conditional on the level of informal care. The social welfare function is a weighted
sum of parents’ and children’s utility. We show that social LTC insurance affects the
exchanges between parents and children and in particular the level of informal care and
the distribution of rents.
The optimal uniform public LTC insurance depends on the attitude towards risk
of parents. Under DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) preferences, public LTC
insurance exacerbates the distortion of informal care. Consequently, the optimal public
LTC coverage provides less than full insurance. The opposite is true under IARA
(increasing absolute risk aversion) preferences. A uniform policy can never insure the
risk of having a high-cost child.
A nonuniform policy that conditions LTC benefits on bequests provides full insur-
ance even for the risk of having high-cost children. The level of informal care provided by
high-cost children is distorted and the direction of the distortion depends on children’s
weight in the social welfare function.
Interestingly, in the uniform as well as in the nonuniform case, the higher the weight
of children in the social welfare function, the higher the optimal average level of informal
care. This apparently counter-intuitive result is due to the exchange motive behind
family help. Under this motive, higher reliance on the family for the provision of long-
term care implies higher rents for children. In our model, crowding out of family help by
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public care only affects social welfare through its (negative) effect on children’s utility.
A main lesson that emerges from our analysis is that in an exchange-based setting,
social insurance should be designed in order to ensure that dependent elderly have to
rely even on high-cost children. This ensures that low-cost children get rewarded for
the informal care they provide.
Another major lesson is that, even with ex ante identical individuals, the nonuniform
policy performs better and is able to provide full insurance against both underlying
risks. In other words, even with identical individuals, social LTC should involve some
measure of means testing and/or recover part of the benefits received by the elderly
from their estate. This results is interesting because means testing is usually justified
by redistribution. We have not considered redistributive motive, but they could only
be expected to reinforce this result.
Throughout the paper we have remained agnostic about the exact nature of the
transfer, gift or bequest, that “pays” for the care, except that we have pointed out
that it affects the timing of the underlying game. From and empirical perspective,
however, the gift interpretation appears to be more compelling. The literature has
found some evidence that inter vivos transfers are larger for those children who provide
informal care (Norton and Van Houtven, 2006). However, these estimates are often
problematic because of endogeneity problems and because measurement of both informal
care and financial transfers within the family is difficult. More reliable estimates require
longitudinal data and a step in that direction is taken by Norton et al. (2014) who use
the 1999 and 2003 waves of National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and show
that children providing informal care are indeed more likely to receive financial transfers
from their parents.
Considering bequests as payment for care is more problematic because research
has shown that bequests are typically divided equally among children (Menchik, 1980;
Tomes, 1981). Even when children provide unequal amounts of informal care, bequests
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tend to be divided equally (Norton and Taylor, 2005). This is true for the US but the
argument is even more compelling for most European countries, where equal sharing
rules are imposed by law. In any event there are also theoretical arguments that favor
inter vivos transfers over bequests as payment for informal care. Gifts are more flexible
and, as argued by Norton and Van Houtven (2006), “can be adjusted quickly to the
amount of care, are less costly than writing a will, and can be kept secret from other
family members and the public”.
Our policy recommendations are made under the assumption that the provision of
informal care is exchange-based. This hypothesis has received empirical support and
appears to apply to certain families. Roughly speaking, “. . . the idea of exchange makes
sense for those extended families where an older person has money and needs help, and
a younger person has time and needs money”, (Norton et al. 2014). But it is clearly not
the only behavioral pattern that is relevant. In reality the different types of intra-family
relations, based on altruism, norms or selfish exchanges, with and without commitment
are likely to coexist.15 The different studies provide partial and intermediate answers
which can provide valuable guidance for the design of social LTC policy, as long as
interpreted with suitable care and keeping in mind the underlying assumptions.
15Alternative approaches explored for instance by Cremer and Roeder (2017) Barrigozzi et al. (2017),
Canta and Pestieau (2014), Ponthie`re (2014).
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since a is independent off g, we can focus on the FOCs (13) and (14) to study the
comparative statics with respect to g. Using subscripts to denote partial derivative,
define
H =
[
P asaa P
as
sa
P asas P
as
ss
]
,
and
D =
[ −P asag
−P assg
]
,
where
P assa = P
as
as = pi[λH
′′
(m)(1− v(a, β)− (1− λ)H ′′(m)(va(a, β)− va(a, β))] = piA, (A.1)
P asss = (1− pi)U
′′
(s) + pi[λH
′′
(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)], (A.2)
P asag = pi
{
λH
′′
(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]
}
= piA, (A.3)
P assg = pi[λH
′′
(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)], (A.4)
and where
A = λH
′′
(m)[1− va(a, β)]− (1− λ)H ′′(m)[va(a, β)− va(a, β)]. (A.5)
Using Cramer’s rule we obtain
∂a
∂g
=
∣∣∣∣ −P asag P assa−P assg P asss
∣∣∣∣
|H| ,
where |H| > 0 from the SOC.
Substituting from (A.1)–(A.4), evaluating the determinant and simplifying succes-
sively yields
sgn
(
∂a
∂g
)
= sgn
(∣∣∣∣ −Api Apipi[λH ′′(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)] (1− pi)U ′′(s) + pi[λH ′′(m) + (1− λ)H ′′(m)]
∣∣∣∣)
= sgn
(−piA[(1− pi)u′′(s)]) = sgn(A).
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To sum up we have to study the sign of A defined by (A.5). Substituting from (15) and
rearranging yields
A = (1− λ)∆vA
[
H ′′(m)
H ′(m)
H ′(m)
−H ′′(m)
]
.
Because ∆vA > 0, this expression has the same sign as the term in brackets on the RHS.
Consequently we have
A > 0 ⇐⇒ H
′′(m)
H ′(m)
>
H
′′
(m)
H ′(m)
⇐⇒ −H
′′(m)
H ′(m)
< −H
′′
(m)
H ′(m)
.
Since m < m this is true under IARA (Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion), while DARA
(Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion) yields A < 0.
A.2 Only parents have full information
If the government does not observe β, but parents do, the problem of the government
is given by
max
g,g,τ ,τ
Gaf =wT − pi(λg + (1− λ)g)− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ pi
[
λH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + (1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g)
]
s.t. af (τ , β)− τ + g ≥ af (τ , β)− τ + g,
af (τ , β)− τ + g ≥ af (τ , β)− τ + g, (A.6)
where we added the relevant IC constraints to (18). We shall assume that (A.6), the
constraint from the low-cost type to the high-cost type is binding. This constraint is
effectively violated at the full information solution characterized in Section 4.1. To see
this recall that this solution implies
af (τ , β)− τ + g = af (τ , β)− τ + g < af (τ , β)− τ + g,
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so that
g < g + τ − τ + af (τ , β)− af (τ , β),
which violates condition (A.6). Substituting the incentive constraint into Gaf the gov-
ernment’s problem can then be rewritten as
max
g,τ ,τ
Gaf =wT − pi(g + (1− λ)
(
τ − τ + af (τ , β)− af (τ , β)
)
− s+ (1− pi)U (s)
+ piλH(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g) + pi(1− λ)H(s+ af (τ , β)− τ + g).
The FOCs are given by
∂Gaf
∂g
= −pi + pi [λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 0, (A.7)
∂Gaf
∂τ
= pi(1− λ)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0, (A.8)
∂Gaf
∂τ
= piλH ′(m)
[
∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
+ pi (1− λ) (H ′(m)− 1) [∂af (τ , β)
∂τ
− 1
]
= 0.
(A.9)
Recall that af (τ , β) > af (τ , β), which implies m = s + af (τ , β) − τ + g > m = s +
af (τ , β) − τ + g. Hence, condition (A.7) implies that H ′(m) < 1. Furthermore, using
our assumption on af along with (20), which defines τ ff , we have
∂af (τ ff , β)
∂τ
>
∂af (τ ff , β)
∂τ
= 1,
so that at τ ff the first term on the RHS of (A.9) is zero while the second term is
negative, which in turn implies τaf < τ ff (from the SOC). This is not surprising. In
order to relax the IC constraint, the optimal policy distorts τ downwards, which leads
to a downward distortion on a. Conversely, τ and a are not distorted; condition (A.8)
is identical to its full information counterpart (19).
Combining (A.7) with (21), the first-order condition for parents’ saving , yields
U ′ (s) =
[
λH ′(m) + (1− λ)H ′(m)] = 1
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As in the case with uniform transfers, the optimal LTC policy implies full insurance
against dependence but, under asymmetric information, it is not possible to provide
insurance against the risk of having high-cost children.
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